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1. Introduction
Between the 1930s and the 1970s the integration of Argentina to the world economy was
rather limited. In the 1990s, after some transitory and weak attempts at opening in the
seventies and eighties, the authorities pursued a number of policy measures which, along with
changes in the international environment, greatly increased the degree of trade and financial
integration. In a few years, Argentina, formerly a typical closed economy, became a member
of the global economy.
Externally oriented reforms were complemented and often reinforced by a number of domestic
measures. Most markets were deregulated and many state-owned firms were privatised.
Perhaps the most important complement to external opening was macroeconomic stabilisation.
Inflation was controlled after decades of instability and a brief period of hyperinflation.
The combination of macroeconomic stability, drastic reduction of the state interference in the
economy and integration to the global economy resulted in a GDP growth of around 50%
during the decade. In contrast to these favourable results, the nineties were also characterised
by two worrying economic phenomena: the explosive growth of inequality and unemployment.
The Gini coefficient increased from 44.2 in 1992 to 50.1 in 1998, while the unemployment
rate augmented almost 10 points in only a few years. Never before the Argentine economy
enjoyed such a high income level as in the nineties, but at the same time, it has not
experimented such high inequality and unemployment levels, either. Even though the structural
transformation and increased globalisation of the economy seem to have created the basis for
long-term growth, it is possible that they have impacted in a negative way over many sectors
of the population.
The central objective of this paper is to study the links between changes in Argentina’s
integration to the world economy and the growth of income inequality and poverty . To that
aim, both phenomena are described and the links relating them are analysed. The article does
not deepen into the analysis of some particular cause, and it does not provide concluding
evidence of alternative hypothesis. Its contribution consists in presenting in a systematic way
different explanations of the development of inequality in Argentina and in evaluating their
relative importance in the light of the economic theory and the available empirical evidence.
The paper concludes that the increasing integration to the global economy was very likely a
significant determinant of the inequality jump in the nineties. Two are the main channels that link
globalisation to inequality. The first one operates through sector reallocations. Being Argentina
a country relatively abundant in natural resources and skilled labour, trade liberalisation implied
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2a shift towards production and employment in sectors that use those factors more intensively,
and in turn an increase in the relative return to natural resources and a widening of the wage
gap between the skilled and the unskilled workers. The available evidence shows however that
this story explains only a small part of the observed change in the income distribution.
Globalisation can affect inequality through a second channel. The fall in the price of capital and
the introduction of new skilled labour intensive technologies, both likely consequences of the
greater integration of Argentina to the world markets, implied an increase in the intensity of use
of skilled labour in all the productive sectors, and hence an increase in the skill premium. This
effect seems to be a more significant source of increasing income disparities.
Globalisation is not the only factor behind the increase in inequality in the nineties. The
decrease of labour unions power, a social environment more permeable to accept wage
differentials, the fall in the minimum wage, the increase in unemployment, the increase of the
relative size of the poorest families, and the increase in the dispersion of pensions payments
also contributed to increasing income inequality in Argentina to unprecedented levels.
Fortunately, not all factors played an inequality-increasing role. The severe macroeconomic
crises and the hyperinflation that dramatically affected income distribution in the late-eighties
were not present in the nineties. Fiscal and social policies did not have a very active role in
alleviating the effects of increasing poverty and inequality. Actually, inequality and poverty
trends are basically unchanged when government transfers (cash and in-kind) are included in
family income.
Although there seems to be links between globalisation and inequality, opposing to integration
and new technology incorporation is not a reasonable policy option, since economic growth is
related to the capability of inserting the country in the global economy and of increasing the
productivity through the absorption of new technologies. The Argentine successful growth
story in most of the nineties is itself an example of this assertion. Two policy options remain: in
the short-run the extension of the social safety net seems inevitable. This calls for more
resources but also, and perhaps especially, for a more efficient use of public funds. In the
medium and long run a sizeable increase in the supply of skilled labour through formal
education and training can help to reduce the wage gap between the skilled and the unskilled.
The rest of the work is ordered in the following way. In section 2 the main transformations
occurred in the Argentine economy during the last three decades are reviewed, with particular
accent in the changes related to globalisation: the opening of trade of goods and services, the
reception of direct foreign investment and the absorption of technology. Section 3 presents the
evolution of inequality, poverty, and aggregate welfare in Argentina. Part of the literature on
labour inequality is concentrated on the analysis of the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers. Section 3 also gives evidence about this gap for the Argentinean case. Section 4
constitutes the core of the work. It presents alternative explanations for the growth in
inequality, with particular emphasis in the ones related to globalisation. Section 5 concludes
with an evaluation of the main results and some policy lessons.
2. The process of international integration of the Argentine economy
3This section summarises the main changes that took place in the Argentine economy during the
last three decades, particularly in the last 10 years, characterised by deep structural internal
changes as well as changes in the degree of integration with the rest of the world. Table 2.1, at
the end of the paper, reproduces the main economic variables for the 1970-1999 period. The
objective of this review is to present the economic scene for the distributive changes outlined in
the Introduction and documented in the following section.
The first part describes the Argentine economic experience since the 70s and the economic
and institutional factors that led to the ongoing integration process with the rest of the world. In
the second part, the causes and challenges posed by this process beginning in the 90s are
described. The third and last part tackle in a greater detail the quantitative and qualitative
effects over the endowment and accumulation of productive factors, the goods markets, the
services markets, the transfer of technology, and the migration flows.
2.1. An overview of the Argentine economy, 1970-1999
Several stages in the Argentine economic development can be distinguished:
(i) Between 1945 and 1975 the country was involved in an import substitution process,
conceived for promoting industrialisation based in national production. The government took
over the provision of public utilities and the production in industries that were considered
strategic, as iron, oil, and petrochemical products. At the same time, it established strong
regulations and an intricate scheme of taxes and subsidies over the private activity. Some
control over the application of public and private banks’ deposits and the imposition of trade
barriers were part of the widespread state intervention during this period.
(ii) The failure of this development strategy determined a radical change between 1976
and 1982 towards a policy of commercial and financial openness, although the state did not
give up the economic activities under its direct management.
(iii) After the 1980 financial crisis and the 1982 external debt crisis, between 1983 and
1990 the government withdrew the previous reforms and there was a failed attempt at
promoting industrial activity through fiscal instruments. The budget deterioration and the
inflationary spiral, which started in 1975, led to the hyperinflationary episodes of 1989 and
1990.
(iv) The social consensus around the need of eliminating inflation and returning to the
growth path after the stagnation of the two previous decades was crystallised in 1991 with
some structural reforms that included a renewed fiscal and monetary order, massive
privatisations, commercial and financial opening, and deregulation of the private activity. The
inflation rate fell to international levels and the per capita income raised by more than 50%
over the decade. On the other hand, social problems worsened because of the growth of
unemployment and inequality.
Towards the mid 70s, the Argentine economy was trapped in a spiral of economic, political
and social instability, in the context of a marked state intervention in the economy that
4privileged the redistribution towards wage earners and generated strong pressures over the
fiscal accounts. The military government instrumented since 1976 a program intended to
reduce the inflation rate through a quick commercial liberalisation and a scheme of small and
decreasing devaluations. The deregulation of the financial system and the removal of capital
controls encouraged the external indebtedness of the private and public sectors. The
combination of internal factors (insolvency of local producers of exportable goods, deficient
supervision and regulation of the financial system) and external ones (rise in the international
interest rate since the late 70s) produced a financial collapse that led the government to
assume a great part of the private external debt and to finance the banking system rescue
through the inflationary tax. As in other developing countries, the adverse internal and external
shocks generated serious difficulties to make the debt services, which caused the exclusion of
the country of the voluntary international credit market until 1991.
The economic situation continued to be disappointing after the democratic restoration in 1983.
Despite reversing the external opening and deregulation measures of the previous
administration, prices continued their rising path, together with the fiscal deficit (that averaged
an annual 5.5% in 1983-1989). A heterodox anti-inflationary plan, the Austral Plan, enjoyed a
temporary success between 1985 and 1987, but it did not prevent inflation from returning with
unusual virulence in 1988. Several incentive programs for capital intensive industries and for
sectors with chronic problems (sugar, tobacco) - financed through tax benefits, subsidised
public utilities prices, and preferential credit rates - were carried out. While the annual
estimated cost of these subsidies was high (between 1% and 2% of the GDP), the results were
not successful at all, as a consequence of the deficient design and supervision of the
beneficiaries.1 Trade protectionism amplified the distortions generated by the governmental
intervention. Being inflation the policymakers’ top priority, the conformation of a coherent
development plan was not a crucial goal at the time. According to a well-known Argentine
economist, Argentina was “ socialism without a plan and capitalism without a market”.
Since the 90s Argentina experienced remarkable changes in its macro and microeconomic
structure. Towards 1989 the country was immerse in a deep crisis characterised by galloping
inflation and productive recession, together with a distorting state intervention in the financial
system, the public utilities, and other various activity branches. The  climate of uncertainty and
recession gave birth to a solid social consensus concerning the need of putting an end to
inflation as a precondition for any subsequent development strategy. After some failed
attempts, the peronist administration initiated in 1989 managed to stop the inflationary process
in 1991, through the pegging of the exchange rate and a program of fiscal austerity. The first
measure was directed at stopping the price inertia, because prices used to be adjusted
according to the rate of devaluation.2 Budget discipline was aimed at controlling the monetary
emission that financed the fiscal deficit –the main cause of the inflationary race. Obviously,
both instruments were intimately related: the credible fixing of the exchange parity required a
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5severe budget management, otherwise the monetary financing would have eroded Central
Bank reserves that were necessary to achieve the exchange target. The ambitious
Convertibility Plan, launched at the beginning of 1991, imposed by law the prohibition to
finance the government and banking system through the expansion of the monetary base. Any
increase in the monetary base should be backed up by an increase in the international reserves
of the Central Bank.
The confidence induced by the plan, both inside and outside the country, favoured a marked
productive reactivation. The remonetisation of residents and the inflow of foreign capitals
contributed to the revitalisation of the financial system and the expansion of the aggregate
expenditure via banking credit. The control of tax evasion and the increase of the tax base,
together with the privatisations, made possible the increase of public resources and the
achievement of fiscal equilibrium, in spite of the increase of public expenditure. The massive
capital inflows more than compensated the trade and current account deficits, contributing to
the sustainability of the fixed exchange rate of one peso for one dollar.
Summing up, the plan enjoyed immediate success not only regarding inflation, but also with
respect to growth. The annual rate of inflation, that had reached a maximum of 5000% in
1989, decreased to 3.8% in 1994, while the average GDP growth rate jumped to 8.2% in
1991-1994 from - 1.1% in 1980-1989. The favourable expectations and the decrease of the
interest rate stimulated credit and expenditure, without generating inflationary pressures due to
the high idle installed capacity and the increase in labour productivity. The fast growth of
1991-1994 was possible without a considerable increase in investment and employment.
As a complement to the macroeconomic stabilisation, the government launched a series of
structural reforms.  Privatisations had the double purpose of raising funds for the state and of
increasing the efficiency in the provision of public utilities, of disastrous functioning under the
state monopoly. The decrease of utilities rates encouraged lower domestic prices, and the
removal of trade barriers promoted efficiency improvements in productive units, reducing at
the same time the cost of imported inputs. Another important point was the creation in March
1991 of the Mercosur, a customs union with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Concerning the
financial system, the supervision and regulation of private institutions was strengthened, with
high reserve and capital requirements so as to reinforce financial stability. The full opening to
the international credit markets and the reform of the pensions system contributed to the
deepening of capital markets, translated into a higher volume of banking credit to the private
sector and new issues of stock and debt in the market (see Bebczuk (2000)). Finally, the state
itself adhered to the new economic frame reducing its payroll, simplifying administrative
procedures and eliminating subsidies and different regulations that represented a burden for the
private sector.
However, some drawbacks appeared shortly after, as by-products of the very stabilisation
plan. In December 1994, the Mexican devaluation exploded, and the consequent “Tequila
Effect” affected Argentina and other developing countries. Although the country exhibited in
general solid macroeconomic fundamentals, domestic and foreign investors revised adversely
6their expectations, generating an important capital outflow and a significant reduction of
deposits in the financial system. The trade and current account deficits since 1991, the
apparent exchange rate overvaluation, the deterioration of the public accounts since the
beginning of 1994 and the increase of unemployment, also since 1991, were some of the
negative signals arising from the new economic scene. But it must be kept in mind that
Argentina was at the time enjoying a rapid GDP growth with low inflation, and that the external
and fiscal unbalances were not particularly pronounced compared to most emerging
economies.
The causes of these complications are not clearly elucidated yet, but some hypotheses do offer
convincing explanations. The negative trade balance was a consequence of the demand
recovery, that was partially translated into greater imports: while exports grew 65% between
1991 and 1994, imports increased 413%, generating a trade deficit of U$S 4,100 millions in
1994 (it is noteworthy that in 1990, when GDP decreased 2.9%, commercial surplus reached
a historical maximum of U$S 8,100 millions). The current account deficit reached U$S 11,000
millions (4.3% of the GDP) in 1994, from a level of U$S 647 millions (0.4% of GDP) in
1991. The appreciation of the peso (the real exchange rate fell 42% between 1990 and 1994)
is the joint result of the fixed exchange rate regime and the price inflation of non-tradable
goods as a consequence of a stronger domestic demand. The fiscal deficit observed since
1994 (an average of 1.4% of GDP in 1994-1999) was due to the growth in public
expenditure, while the tax and other public receipts reached a plateau, in a partial reversion of
the fiscal austerity maintained over 1991-1993. Finally, the reduction of the payrolls of the
private sector, motivated by the need of productivity increases in a competitive environment),
the legal rigidities of the labour market, the greater activity rate and the firings in the public
sector appear to be the most evident causes of the growth in unemployment.
After the Mexican crisis, both the activity level and the financial system were rapidly
recomposed since the second half of 1995, without needing to abandon the convertibility and
the fixed exchange rate, strengthening this way the macroeconomic credibility of the country.
Nevertheless, some previously cited weaknesses still persist: external deficit, unemployment,
fiscal deficit, and wide activity level fluctuations. Being a small economy, open to commercial
and financial flows and with a high and increasing external debt, the world economic conditions
exacerbate, via the interest rate and the terms of trade, the macroeconomic volatility.3,4 The
lack of any independent monetary policy because of the Convertibility Law and the restrictions
to fiscal policy due to the need of reaching budget equilibrium has inhibited any counter-
cyclical policy measures.
Table 2.1.b displays some qualitative indicators that reflect the main changes in Argentina’s
economic situation since 1970:
Table 2.1.b
                                                
3 Avila et al. (1997) present evidence for Argentina that changes in the country risk premium affect foreign
capital inflows, and that these inflows have a positive effect on industrial activity.
4 The lack of capital controls may increase the external vulnerability, but there is no robust evidence on
this issue. For example, Edwards (1999) points out that in the Chilean case, these controls contributed to
increase the ratio of long- over short-term inflows, but they did not prevent domestic interest rates to
display high volatility over the nineties.
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Period GDP Inflatio
n
External Trade Financial State Developme
nt
Trend in Trend in
Growth Debt Opennes
s
Openness Intervention
in
Strategy Unemployme
nt
Inequality
Economic
Activity
1970-75 Moderate High and Stable Low Low High Import Medium Stable
increasin
g
Substitution
1976-82 Moderate High and Increasing Low High High Free trade Medium Increasing
increasin
g
1983-89 Low High and Increasing Low High High Subsidisation Medium Increasing
increasin
g
of some
domestic
Industries
1990-99 High Low Increasing Relatively High Low Free trade High Increasing
High and markets
2.2. The process of international integration of the Argentine economy in the
nineties
At the time of evaluating the degree of integration of Argentina to the world economy, a
difference must be highlighted in terms of trade and financial openness. At the trade level, as
tariff and non-tariff protection obstructed the flow of goods, Argentina clearly was a closed
economy until 1990. But regarding financial policy, there were no major legislative changes in
recent years for attracting international credit: in 1976 and 1977 most legal constraints on
capital movements had already been removed, and the financial system had been liberalised.
As a matter of fact, it was the agitated credit history of the country in the 80s and the
macroeconomic and institutional instability that isolated Argentina from the international credit
circuit between 1982 and 1990. The perception by foreign investors of a greater economic
stability and of a greater rule of law, more than a new legal frame, stimulated capital inflows
since 1991. The decrease of the country risk premium (the difference between the Argentine
bond return in dollars and the U.S. Treasury bond return for the same maturity) reflects this
phenomena: after reaching an average of 25 percentage points (2500 basic points) in 1988-
1990, it fell to an average of 4 percentage points (400 basic points) in 1991-1994.
It is necessary to make clear that the decision to open the economy in the 90s was not the
result of a deliberate development strategy, but a by-product of a plan whose almost exclusive
target was the elimination of inflation. The hyperinflationary environment in which the Argentine
economy was living during the late 80s and the early 90s relegated to a second place any other
8policy goal, generating an unprecedented consensus around the lowering of inflation at any
cost. The same society that had opposed to the previous attempts of reducing the fiscal deficit
and selling public enterprises was now favourably disposed to these changes.
Along with the previously described fiscal and monetary measures, the government initiated in
the early 90s a program of deregulation, privatisation and trade opening. The authorities had
not planned any development strategy at the moment of executing these changes. Deregulation
and integration, both financial and commercial, were rapidly carried out, under the urgency of
the circumstances, and there was not any gradual schedule to allow the private sector
adjustment to the new circumstances. Anyway, it was thought that an economy free of
distortions would be able to allocate efficiently its resources and to exploit its static and
dynamic comparative advantages; the plain failure of the import substitution strategy and the
promotion of domestic industries up to the early 80s, supported, by opposition, this new
paradigm.5 With very few exceptions, there has not been in the 90s any subsidies for the
productive sector.  In retrospect, these policies and the  lack of any supporting social policies
in the context of an abrupt change from a protected and regulated economy, set the ground for
an increase of inequality and unemployment.
Certainly, the international financial conditions, particularly the decrease of the interest rate in
the U.S., contributed to the success of the Convertibility Plan through the inflow of foreign
capitals and the return of domestic capitals which had left the country in the past. Since 1991
different factors contributed to the financial reintegration of the country to the world economy.
These factors, shared with other emerging economies, can be classified in pull factors
(domestic changes that made the country more attractive) and push factors (changes in
developed countries that made investment in other countries attractive). Among the pull factors
it can be mentioned: (i) the control of inflation, (ii) the reduction of the fiscal deficit, (iii) the
privatisations and deregulations, (iv) the regularisation of the external debt through the Brady
Plan of 1992, (v) the pegging of a credible exchange rate, (vi) the trade opening, (vii) the
solvency and liquidity of the financial system under an adequate state regulation and
supervision, and (viii) the complete absence of legal, tax and bureaucratic constraints to foreign
capital movements. The main push factors include: (i) the decrease in the international interest
rate at the beginning of the decade, (ii) the growing importance of institutional investors and
their associated need to diversify their portfolios, and (iii) the expanded use of new
communication technologies.
The access to external credit had for Argentina various positive aspects:
(i) It constituted an expansive factor of the aggregate demand in the short run. The
reactivation of 1991-1994 is partially explained by foreign capital inflows.
(ii) It allowed the country to increase fixed investment without sacrificing current
consumption.
                                                
5  Besides these domestic factors, the ideological change favouring liberalism at an international level in
the last decades can not be ignored.
9However, these benefits have several actual and potential costs associated:
(i) The foreign investors’ expectations are volatile and not always based on the economic
fundamentals of the recipient economy. The contagion among emergent economies and
herding behaviour on the part of international investors constitute frequent phenomena.6 The
notorious oscillations of capital flows and the country risk premium in short periods clearly
supports this assertion:
                                                
6 See Nogués and Grandes (2000) for evidence on the Argentine case.
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Table 2.2
Country risk premium of the Argentine government (*)
1993-1999
Statistic Basic Points
Median 673
Mean 705
Maximum 1761 Mar-95
Minimum 263 Aug-97
Standard Deviation 303
(*) Spread Floating Rate Bond over U.S. Treasury Bonds.
(ii) The activity level in small open economies is particularly sensitive to capital inflows and
outflows, generating very steep cycles.7
(iii) The increase of the external debt intensifies the financial vulnerability in the presence of
external shocks to the interest rate. In the Argentine case, the total external debt has
augmented from 29.9% to 51.7% of the GDP between 1991 and 1999.
(iv) The higher degree of openness amplifies the effect of variations in the terms of trade, that
have shown an erratic evolution in the last decade:
Table 2.3
Terms of Trade for Argentina, 1991-1999
Index 1993=100
Year Exports Imports Terms
Price Price of Trade
Index Index
1991 95.9 105.2 91.2
1992 99.7 102.5 97.3
1993 100.0 100.0 100.0
1994 102.7 101.5 101.1
1995 108.4 107.0 101.3
1996 115.5 105.9 109.0
1997 112.0 103.4 108.3
1998 100.2 98.1 102.2
1999 89.0 92.5 96.3
Source: INDEC.
(v) In order to satisfy the expectations of international investors and consolidate the country’s
external credibility the use monetary and fiscal instruments to smooth the business cycle is
severely constrained.
(vi) The debt financing of fiscal unbalances elevates the external debt stock without improving
the ability to repay it.
                                                
7 For an econometric estimation for Argentina, see Avila et al (1997).
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It is hard to draw any definite conclusion about the net benefit of the process for Argentina. In
the first place, a longer experience is required in order to make a sounder evaluation of pros
and cons.  Secondly, beyond the theoretical advantages of opening the economy, the final
outcome depends both on domestic policies and exogenous shocks. For example, the
instability associated to capital flows can be created either by the lack of a consistent fiscal
policy or by international contagion unrelated to the country’s fundamental. Concerning
commercial opening, the preliminary evaluation is also controversial: against its well-known
long-run benefits, the reallocation of factors between sectors is likely to have some adverse
effects in the short- and medium-term.
2.3. Effects of the integration of the Argentine economy to the world economy
2.3.1. Changes in factor endowments and the sources of growth
As many other developing economies, Argentina was a closed economy until the first part of
the 70s. Keeping in mind that the initial conditions could have limited the economic and
institutional performance of the country during the present globalisation process, this section
briefly describes the main structural characteristics in the 1965-1975 decade and then reports
the changes that took place in the subsequent 25 years.
In Table 2.4 it can be observed that in 1965-1975 Argentina was a country with medium-high
per capita income. The growth rate was significantly lower and the inflation rate higher than the
world average, a trend reinforced in the following 15 years. To evaluate  factor endowments,
some measures of physical capital (capital-labour ratio, an infrastructure index and the
investment rate), human capital (years of secondary schooling)  natural resources (area,
population density and share of agriculture in the product), and a rough estimation of the
aggregate level of technology were constructed. Based on these indicators, Argentina
appeared to be abundant in human and physical capital relative to natural resources, when
compared to developing countries, but not to OECD countries.
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Table 2.4
Some structural economic indicators. Average 1965-1975.
Mean values for different regions and Argentina.
Variable World OCDE South East South Latin Argentina
Mean Asia Africa America
Per capita GDP (1985 U$S) 2,679 7,079 1,546 917 2,601 5,018
Real growth rate of GDP 2.8% 3.4% 4.7% 1.9% 2.3% 1.9%
Annual inflation rate 10.0% 6.0% 23.0% 6.0% 15.0% 31.0%
Capital/labor ratio (relative to OCDE) 0.33 1.00 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.26
Investment rate 0.16 0.29 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.17
Infrastructure index (*) 1.43 3.62 0.80 -0.50 1.51 2.59
Secondary schooling (in years) 0.57 1.29 0.61 0.15 0.51 0.66
Technolgy level (relative to OCDE) (**) 0.68 1.00 0.54 0.44 0.67 0.87
Exports/GDP 0.28 0.27 0.39 0.28 0.26 0.07
Imports/GDP 0.30 0.28 0.44 0.32 0.28 0.06
Primary exports/GDP 0.74 0.40 0.80 0.88 0.81 0.76
Contribution of agriculture to GDP 0.25 0.08 0.31 0.37 0.19 0.10
Population density (inhabitants per km
2
) 3.11 1.99 7.39 1.09 1.43 0.81
Area (in mill. Km2) 2.77
Population (millions) 22.3
(*) Simple average of the logarithm of the number of telephone lines per worker, kilometers of paved roads
per worker and energy production per worker. (**) [per capita GDP(region)/per capita GDP(OECD)]^-0.4.
See Romer (1994).
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the World Bank.
While the proportion of primary exports with respect to total exports is consistent with the
relative endowments of physical and human capital (higher than the OECD average and lower
than other developing countries), the country presents export and import ratios to GDP
considerably lower than the other regions, a point that would be analysed later.8
The county's performance in terms of growth and its sources is displayed in the following table:
Table 2.5
Sources of Argentine growth.
As percentage
Period Average annual Inputs without adjusting by quality
growth rate Labor Capital TFP
of GDP
1940-1980 3.60 0.95 1.55 1.10
1980-1989 -1.06 0.70 0.04 -1.80
1990-1997 6.09 0.74 1.42 3.94
Source: Elías (1992) and Meloni (1999).
Several sharp differences call the attention:
(i) The growth rate in the 90s was considerably higher than in the previous decade –when
it was negative - and also higher than the growth rate in 1940-1980;
                                                
8 Concerning this point, it is interesting to note that after ranking a group of 107 countries by their export
ratios to GDP, Argentina was in the 102nd place in 1965-1975 as well as in 1985-1995.
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(ii) Total factor productivity was the main cause of the contraction of the 80s and the
expansion of the 90s. Changes in the degree of government intervention in the economic
system, trade openness,  and productive technology and efficiency are behind this different
growth scenarios over time;
(iii)     The weight of physical capital (relative to labour) was higher in the 90s than in the 80s.
As expected, capital intensity moved inversely with its relative price: the capital/labour ratio
increased 32% between 1991 and 1998, while its relative price decreased 40% in the same
period.9
2.3.2. Goods market
The low import and export levels, although suggestive, can not be taken as a definitive proof of
the export weakness or of the presence of distortions and trade barriers. In the long run, a
country’s export performance is determined by its import needs, on the demand side, and by
its export competitiveness, on the supply side.
A regression of the ratio of exports to GDP against a series of variables susceptible of
capturing these effects is likely to uncover the level of theoretical exports, a prediction of the
equilibrium value based on the structural characteristics of the country.10 The estimated
coefficient allows to predict the theoretical exports and to confront them with the observed
ones in the period 1965-1995: in 1965-1995 the export level was on average a 7.7% of the
GDP, but the country should had exported a 17.2% according to its structural determinants. In
the 90s, the export coefficient jumped from 7.7% in 1990-1994 to 10.2% in 1995-1999,
revealing a higher degree of openness, but still far from the theoretical level. Comparing the
80s and the 90s, an increase of exports from 6.3% to 8.9% of GDP and a significant growth
of imports from 4.4% to 10.4% is observed.11
The same methodology has been used to predict the theoretical level of primary exports as a
proportion of total exports (the rest corresponds to manufacturing exports) for the same
sample of countries.12 Argentina’s primary exports in 1965-1995 (76.7% of the total) are
similar to the theoretical ones (75.2%). In spite of the widely spread belief that Argentina is
excessively biased towards its primary exports, the econometric analysis shows that the actual
export structure responds to the comparative advantage of the country in this sector.
                                                
9 See Bour and Susmel (1999).
10 The estimation (not reported but available on request) ratifies the stated hypothesis and presents a
good adjustment. The included variables were population, area and latitude (negative sign) and per capita
product, investment rate and infrastructure (positive sign).
11 As it will be shown below, the production of  tradable goods (agriculture and industry) fell in relation to
non-tradable ones (services). This process is common to most economies as they develop,  though.
12 It is to be expected that the comparative advantage in primary goods increase with the availability of
natural resources, a warm or hot climate and the importance of agriculture as a productive activity, and
decrease with the technological and industrial level of development of the country. The closeness to the
tropics, the share of agriculture in total aggregate value, the total area, and (the inverse of) the
capital/labour ratio are indicators of the relative endowment of productive factors. The productive
infrastructure, the per capita GDP and the average years of secondary schooling capture the complexity of
the productive system that makes possible the export of more elaborated goods. Results were highly
supportive of these hypotheses.
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Although a good part of the explanation relies on structural determinants, the trade policy has
deepened this relative isolation. Table 2.6 shows the average export and import taxes between
1967 and 1996. This period has been split into four sub-periods according to the prevailing
external orientation: up to 1975, the import substitution policy had a clear bias towards trade
autarchy; the military administration of 1976-1982 gave priority to outward orientation,
situation that was reverted in the first stage of the democratic period (1983-1990); finally,
since 1991 a renewed tendency towards openness can be identified.
Table 2.6
Import and export taxes
Argentina, 1967-1996.
Period Average Export Average Import
Tax Tax
1967-1975 0.09 0.14
1976-1982 0.05 0.14
1983-1990 0.11 0.15
1991-1996 -0.04 0.12
Source: Calculations based on Gay A. (1998).
The average import tariff has been high over the whole period, with a slight decrease in the
90s. Export taxes – an instrument used to extract rents from the agricultural sector- were
particularly high in 1967-1975 and in 1983-1990, becoming negative in the last sub-period.
Evidently, tariffs do not seem to reflect the changes in trade orientation.13
This impression is different when quantitative restrictions and exchange controls are taken into
account (see Rodríguez (1997)). Between 1983 and 1988, more than 50% of the tariff
positions. Since then, and with particular strength since 1991, these restrictions were removed,
surviving  nowadays only a few exceptions. Regarding exchange controls, a means to offer a
differential treatment to exports and imports, they were intensively used only in the early 70s
and in 1983-1990.
Another structural change in the trade front was the creation of the Mercosur regional trade
agreement, together with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay in 1991 after some partial agreements
initiated in 1986. The Mercosur is a customs union, with free trade between its members and a
common external tariff. The treaty is still in process of consolidation after its rather prompt
implementation. Economic and diplomatic tensions have emerged recurrently, as a
consequence of the loss of competitiveness of specific sectors and the persistence of some
national subsidies (especially in Brazil). However, the results are, in general terms, auspicious.
More than the 90% of the tariff positions have been liberalised for intra-regional trade and a
similar fraction is subject to the common external tariff. The association, to which Bolivia and
                                                
13 However, the change is clearer when comparing this situation with the one at the end of 1989: in
November of that year, the average tariff was of 29%, with a maximum level of 40% and a minimum of 0%.
In November, 1992 the average was of 10.2%, the maximum was 20% and the minimum was still 0% (this
last one for capital goods not produced in the country).
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Chile had partially adhered in recent years, has increased intra-regional trade. In the case of
Argentina, the exports to Mercosur went from 7.9% of total exports in 1985 to 35.1% in
1998, while imports increased from 18.3% to 25.7%.14 Anyway, the Argentine trade exhibits
a high degree of international geographic diversification:
Table 2.7
Export destination and import origins for Argentina in 1998
Percentage of  total
MERCOSUR NAFTA European Union Rest Total
Exports 35.1 9.8 17.4 37.7 100
Imports 25.7 22.8 27.4 24.1 100
Source: Informe Económico del Ministerio de Economía y Servicios Públicos.
The changes in the structure of exports and imports are presented in the following table:
Table 2.8
Import and export structure in 1989 and 1997
Exports 1989 1997
Primary Products 21.2 21.6
Agriculture and cattle manufactures 41.6 34.4
Industrial manufactures 33 31.5
Combustibles and energy 4.3 12.4
Total 100 100
Imports
Capital goods 17.6 25.3
Intermediate goods 51.1 33.2
Combustibles 9.2 3.2
Parts for capital goods 16.5 18.2
Consumption goods 5.2 14.9
Passenger vehicles 0.2 5.1
Rest 0.3 0.1
Total 100 100
Source: Informe Económico del Ministerio de Economía y Servicios Públicos.
It is not easy to find, at first glance, a substantial modification in terms of specialisation in
primary and industrial products from the comparison of the structure before and after the
opening process. An increase in oil and energy at the expense of agricultural goods at the
export level, and the growth of capital and consumption imports in detriment of intermediate
goods appear as the main trends.
                                                
14 There is no conclusive evidence concerning the primacy of trade creation or deviation for the Mercosur
(see Connolly and Gunther (1999)). Anyway, the Mercosur could be beneficial as a transition step between
autarchy and unrestricted free trade.
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As the country has a comparative advantage in primary goods, it is expected that capital and
intermediate goods imports constitute a significant portion of total investment. The evolution of
investment and its components over time is presented in the following table:
Table 2.9
Composition of fixed gross internal investment, 1970-1997.
As percentage of total.
Period Gross Domestic Construction  Durable equipment for production
Investment Total Domestic Foreign
1970-1975 100 60.7 39.3 29.1 10.2
1976-1982 100 62.4 37.6 24.6 13.0
1983-1990 100 65.8 34.2 26.2 8.0
1991-1997 100 53.2 46.8 16.8 30.0
Source: Martínez et al (1998).
The proportion of imported goods reached its highest levels in 1976-1982 and particularly in
1991-1997, which is coherent with the preceding observations.
2.3.3. Services markets
Up to 1990 there was virtually no international competition in the services sector. Public
utilities were in hands of the state, preventing any external or domestic competition. The only
sector where foreign participation was relevant was the financial sector. In May 1977, on the
eve of the financial reform of June of that year, 17 of the 119 banks established in the country
were of foreign origin; by the end of 1981, foreign banks ascended to 32 out of 199. While
the expansion in the number of domestic banks was followed by an important contraction
along the 80s, foreign-owned banks had a more permanent character, as 31 of the 181
institutions functioning in 1987 were of foreign capital.
The last decade has been witness of a marked change in the services market. The state has
sold public enterprises and franchised a number of public services to the private sector since
1990. By doing this, public investment displayed a drastic fall that continued the tendency
registered since 1970:
Table 2.10
Public and private investment in Argentina, 1970-1999.
As percentage of GDP.
Period Total Gross Private Public Public/Total Private/Total
Investment Investment Investment (%) (%)
1970-1975 21.7 13.8 7.9 36.6 63.4
1976-1982 24.2 15.5 8.7 35.8 64.2
1983-1990 17.1 12.0 5.0 29.4 70.6
1991-1999 19.1 17.6 1.5 7.6 92.4
      Source: Martínez et al (1998) and Ministerio de Economía y Servicios Públicos.
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Almost 60% of the revenues generated by the privatisations in 1990-1998 (U$S 18,173
millions) came from foreign investors. At the same time, of the total direct foreign investment in
1992-1996, 47% was directed to the service sectors.
Table 2.11
Sector destination of foreign direct investment, 1992-1996.
Sector Millions of U$S % of total
Extractive activities 3169 16.2
Manufacturing industry 6033 30.9
Services 9140 46.8
     Electricity, gas and water 4959 25.4
     Communications 1059 5.4
     Trade 1149 5.9
     Banking 1973 10.1
Others 1176 6.0
TOTAL 19518 100
    Source: Kulfas and Hecker (1998).
2.3.4. Capital markets and foreign capital participation
Another relevant measure of the integration to the world economy is the contribution of foreign
saving (the current account of the balance of payments) in the financing of domestic
investment. Though this variable is influenced by domestic factors that are independent of the
degree of financial integration15, Argentina is, a priori, a foreign saving recipient. Not until the
90s the country went through a extended process of external indebtedness:
Table 2.12
Saving, investment and current account in Argentina, 1970-1999.
As percentage of GDP.
Period Gross Investment Gross Saving Current Account Foreign Direct
Investment
1970-1975 21.7 20.5 -1.2 0.3
1976-1982 24.2 24.4 0.2 0.5
1983-1990 17.1 15.8 -1.3 0.4
1991-1999 (*) 19.1 15.9 -3.2 1.6
            (*) Foreign direct investment corresponds to the period 1992-1997
            Source: Martínez et al (1998), Urbiztondo (1998) and Kulfas and Hecker (1998).
From a global inspection of the balance of payments and its components (not reported) it can
be concluded that over the period 1992-1999: a) in spite of the fact that the country had
accumulated an external deficit of 74.7 thousand million dollars, the Central Bank increased its
international reserves in 19.9 thousand million, indicating that capital inflows more than
compensated the financing needs;  b) exports and imports, measured in current dollars, grew
88% and 75 % respectively, between 1992 and 1999; c) financial and real services explain an
                                                
15 For example, net capital outflows were registered between 1989 and 1991 because of the macroeconomic
instability and the retraction of aggregate demand.
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important part of the deficit compared to the trade balance; d) regarding the capital account, it
can be observed that the non-financial private sector was the main international borrower up
to 1994, with the government taking over that place since then, in a macroeconomic situation
of lower growth and higher fiscal deficit.
The direct foreign investment has moved in a similar fashion. Between 1912 and 1970, direct
foreign investment represented annually only the 0.5% of the GDP, going down to 0.3% in
1971-1976, to return to 0.4% in the following fifteen years. Although Argentina absorbed only
1% of the world’s direct foreign investment in 1991-1996, its volume in terms of the product
has increased fourfold with respect to the 80s, reaching 1.6% of the GDP.16 The principal
sources of these flows had been the United States (33%), Chile (10.7%), France (5.9%) and
Spain (5.5%). The following table shows the different foreign investment modalities between
1992 and 1997:
Table 2.13
Modalities of foreign direct investment in Argentina.
In million dollars and as percentage of the total.
Modalit 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Profits 813 870 839 609 565 805
reinvestme 20.3 34.6 26.9 12.7 11.1 12.1
Capital 474 628 1287 1649 1671 2120
Injections 11.8 25.0 41.3 34.5 32.8 31.9
Acquisitions 384 101 868 1453 2418 2970
9.6 4.0 27.9 30.4 47.5 44.7
Privatisations 2343 916 122 1072 436 752
58.4 36.4 3.9 22.4 8.6 11.3
Total 4014 2515 3116 4783 5090 6647
100 100 100 100 100 100
% of GDP 1.8 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.7 2.1
    Note: first file in million dollars; second file as percentage of the total.
                 Source: Kulfas M. and H. Hecker (1998).
No legal restrictions explain the relatively low (yet increasing) participation of foreign capital.
On the contrary, since 1976 it has been offered equal treatment to domestic and foreign
capital. Besides, since 1989, foreign investment is not subject to pre-approval and its
inscription in the Registro de Inversiones Extranjeras is optional; on the other hand, there are
no restrictions to profit remittances and capital repatriation. Surely, the still high country risk
and the numerous alternatives of international diversification explain the limited interest of
foreign investors, even after the macroeconomic ordering  in the 90s.
                                                
16 It should not be noted that Argentine direct investment to the rest of the world in the 90s reached 7000
million dollars, being the main destinations Brazil (31.3%), Venezuela (17.7%), Bolivia (14.1%) and the
United States (9.7%).
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The stock of foreign investment in Argentina reached in 1999 63 billion dollars (23% of the
GDP). Considering the 160 highest-selling manufacturing firms, the 96 multinational companies
in this group generated in 1997 62.5% of the sales (36% in 1990) (see Kulfas and Hecker
(1998)).
Financial integration is also low in terms of the loan interest rate available to domestic
borrowers in the financial system. While the deposit rate is reasonably arbitraged, the loan rate
is considerably higher than the one the international markets, with the only exception being the
segment of bigger firms (see Buera and Nicolini (1998)).
2.3.5. Technological transfer
Against the expectations of its creators, the import substitution policy instrumented between
1940 and 1980 produced frustrating results in terms of technological progress. The
combination of a perverse incentive scheme and scarce international competition led to an
industrialisation process characterised by a strong productive inefficiency. The brief
deregulatory and opening experience of 1976-1982, far from improving the situation,
deteriorated the solvency of domestic firms in the presence of increased imports and domestic
currency overvaluation.
The reforms of the 90s have promoted a substantial and sustainable change in productivity and
technological advance. Both the absence of state intervention in the economy and the removal
of barriers to international trade induced the private firms to seek the productivity gains
necessary to stay in business.
Particularly, the renewed export and import dynamism allowed domestic firms to gain access
to the state-of-the-art technologies from developed countries. Personal interaction and the
possibility of copying and adopting these processes tends to stimulate technological advance in
developing countries entering the phase of trade liberalisation.17  Katz (1999) presents some
reflections about the technological innovation process in Argentina and other Latin American
countries in the 90s, pointing out the predominant role of the private sector over the state and
of the adoption of foreign technologies over domestic research and development as central
features.
It can not be ignored here the role played by direct foreign investment. Besides promoting
improvements in the management and international marketing of domestic firms, it tends to
favour the access to foreign technologies: by keeping the control over the use and benefits by
the owner, direct foreign investment eliminates the usual resistance to technological transfer
towards economies with a weak protection of property rights. Likewise, through the contact
with providers and clients, the firms receiving foreign investment - for example, the local
subsidiaries of multinational firms- generate knowledge spillovers over other domestic firms.18
                                                
17 See Pissarides (1997) for a theoretical analysis.
18 See IFC (1997) and Blomstrom and Kokko (1996).
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Even if, by its own nature, it is difficult to obtain quantitative information about technological
transfer, we show some indicators to back up the previous hypotheses. Provided that the
technology is frequently incorporated in new capital goods19, the noticeable increase of private
investment as a proportion of GDP (44% between 1983-1990 and 1991-1999, see Table
2.10) and the decrease of the average age of the capital stock, (from 8.8 years in 1989 to 5.9
years in 1996) seem to ratify what was previously stated.  Imported capital goods are an
important vehicle for technology transfer. As it can be observed in Table 2.9, these goods
represented a 30% of total investment in 1999 from a level of 8% in 1983-1990. The
intermediate and capital goods imports as proportion of total imports grew from 36% in the
80s to 45% in 1997. The favourable tariff treatment for capital imports, the real exchange rate
appreciation, and the lower interest rate stimulated the acquisition of foreign equipment and
inputs. Finally, a prediction consistent with the importance of trade in the technology transfer is
that the productivity gap between tradable and non-tradable goods has to grow, as the
following table shows:20
Table 2.14
Production and relative productivity of tradable goods.
Period Tradable Relative
Production/ Productivity
Total Tradables/
Non tradables
1967-1975 0.34 91.9
1976-1982 0.32 95.4
1983-1990 0.30 117.4
1991-1996 0.29 164.3
Source: Calculations based on Gay (1998).
2.3.6. Migrations
The Argentine workforce has been relatively immobile at an international level, both in periods
of openness and isolation. Nevertheless, Argentina has received migrants from neighbouring
countries such as Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile, especially during the cycles of
domestic reactivation. Although the economic integration started in 1986 with the Mercosur,
labour movements to and from Brazil had been scarce.
The only source of reliable information is the Household Permanent Survey. Arruñada and
others (1999) analyse the migratory structure shown by this survey in October 1997, finding
that internal migrants represent 24% of total population, while foreign migrants represent
around the 8%. In particular, recent international immigrants do not reach a 1%; the majority
of domestic and foreign immigrants have more than five years of residence in the country,
                                                
19 See Grossman and Helpman (1994).
20 It is well known that tradable goods tend to display greater productivity increases than nontradable
ones, even if there is not any technological transfer as happened in the first three sub-periods. However,
the jump of 1991-1996 remarkably exceeds the previous trend.
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indicating that the economic recovery of the 90s has not have a great impact over the
migratory decisions,  surely because of the simultaneous rise of the unemployment rate. The
average instruction level of the immigrants, who are mainly employed in low-skilled jobs, is
lower than that of the natives: the 20% of the immigrants has low education against 7% in the
case of the natives.
3. Inequality trends in Argentina
Inequality and poverty had been consistently measured since 1974, date in which the first
Household Permanent Survey (EPH) was taken in the Greater Buenos Aires. 21 However, it
was only in the nineties when the survey was extended to cover all the urban population of the
country. The EPH has the usual deficiencies of most household surveys in the world: non-
negligible non-response, income underreporting and difficulties for capturing some income
sources (e.g. capital income). In addition it only asks incomes, not expenditures or
consumption, and it does no cover rural areas. Various authors have made several corrections
for dealing with these problems.22 It is systematically found that the inequality and poverty
trends are not modified when these adjustments are made.
Table 3.1 summarises the main statistics of inequality for the Greater Buenos Aires from 1974
to 1999.23,24 The equivalent household income of all the individuals with complete and
consistent responses is taken as argument of the inequality indexes.25 Figure 3.1 shows the Gini
coefficient.
Table 3.1
Inequality measures. Equivalent household income distribution.
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-1999
                                                
21 The Greater Buenos Aires is an urban area of 12 millions inhabitants, around one third of the Argentine
population.
22 Llach and Montoya (1999) and Gasparini and Sosa Escudero (2000) correct by income underreporting
and non-response. Using data from the Household Expenditure Survey (ENGH) Sosa Escudero and
Gasparini (2000) impute income from own-housing and Navajas (1999) calculates consumption inequality.
23 The survey covers around 11,000 individuals in that urban area.
24 As it was mentioned, the geographic covering of the EPH was extended in the nineties. The evolution of
inequality for the total of the urban areas in that decade does not significantly differ from that of Greater
Buenos Aires.
25 Following Buhmann et al. (1988) the equivalent income of an individual arises from dividing the income
of that individual’s household by the sum of equivalent adults of the family, raised to a parameter that
reflects moderate scale economies internal to the household (.8). Modifying that parameter does not alter
the main results.
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Gini Theil d10/d1
1974 34.5 0.185 8.0
1980 39.0 0.241 10.9
1981 42.7 0.308 14.1
1982 42.0 0.298 13.2
1984 42.0 0.347 14.3
1985 40.9 0.262 12.4
1986 41.7 0.289 13.0
1987 44.4 0.329 15.9
1988 44.9 0.333 17.3
1989 51.5 0.478 23.9
1990 46.1 0.370 16.1
1991 46.1 0.390 16.0
1992 44.2 0.311 14.7
1993 44.3 0.316 17.0
1994 45.7 0.346 16.4
1995 48.4 0.395 21.2
1996 48.4 0.388 20.5
1997 48.0 0.384 21.3
1998 50.1 0.415 24.3
1999 48.8 0.388 22.6
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. October waves. Note: d10/d1 is the ratio of the mean
household equivalent income of the top decile over that mean for the bottom decile.
Figure 3.1
Gini coefficient. Equivalent household income distribution
Greater Buenos Aires, 1974-1999
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Inequality has been increasing for the last 25 years in Argentina.26 The periods of greater
acceleration are the second half of the seventies, the last three years of the eighties, and
the middle and last part of the nineties.
                                                
26 Actually, according to the EPH and fragmented evidence of the sixties and early seventies, income
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Inequality strongly increased during the second half of the seventies and the first part of the
eighties, coinciding with a period of more international trade openness, suppression of civil
liberties, restrictions to the action of the labour unions, and by the end of the period,
macroeconomic crisis. The first part of the democratic government, started in 1983, shows
relative stability in the inequality indicators. In contrast, towards the last part of the eighties
income distribution worsens drastically, in association with the hyperinflationary process. The
stability achieved since the implementation of the Convertibility Plan generates a reduction of
inequality to levels a little higher than those of the previous period of macroeconomic stability.27
Since 1992/93 the argentine economy returns to a pattern of growing inequality to the point of
reaching levels only comparable to the ones experimented during the hyperinflationary peak.
Frequently the discussion over the determinants of inequality is carried out in terms of the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Table 3.2 presents the real and relative wage of
various socio-demographic groups in four years of relative macroeconomic stability: 1980,
1986, 1992 and 1998. The average real wage decreased strongly between 1980 and 1986,
descended moderately towards 1992 and recovered in the nineties, reaching a similar level to
that in 1986, but significantly lower than in 1980.
The most interesting phenomenon of the table is the different evolution of the hourly wage
income between educational groups. Between 1980 and 1992 wages fell in greater magnitude
for college graduates, reducing the income gap. In contrast, between 1992 and 1998 while
real hourly wages did not significantly change for workers with a high school degree or less,
they substantially increased for the group of college graduates. The relative wage of college
graduates, that has fallen from 2.20 to 1.85 in the eighties, recovered by the ends of the
nineties reaching a level of 2.32.
Table 3.2
Real and relative wages by sociodemographic groups
Greater Buenos Aires, 1980, 1986, 1992 y 1998
                Hourly wages ($ 1998)                 Relative hourly wages
1980 1986 1992 1998 1980 1986 1992 1998
Total 15.16      9.80        8.25        9.75        
Gender
   Males 15.82      10.39      8.42        9.99        1.04        1.05        1.02        1.02        
   Females 13.93      8.86        7.97        9.39        0.92        0.90        0.96        0.96        
Education
   Without a high school degree 12.03      7.79        6.39        6.57        0.74        0.77        0.80        0.75        
   High School graduates 20.25      11.93      9.55        10.12      1.24        1.19        1.20        1.16        
   College graduates 35.97      20.97      14.77      20.26      2.20        2.08        1.85        2.32        
Age
   18 to 30 12.82      8.10        7.02        7.40        0.84        0.82        0.85        0.76        
   31 to 50 16.33      11.08      9.13        10.69      1.07        1.13        1.11        1.10        
   51 to 65 16.76      9.70        8.25        11.66      1.10        0.99        1.00        1.19        
                                                                                                                                              
inequality started to increase in the mid-seventies (Altimir, 1986 and Gasparini, 1999a).
27 The drastic increment of inequality during the hyperinflation of 1988-1990 is in part spurious, provided
the EPH captures current incomes (see Neri (2000) for the Brazilian case). Consequently, the statistics also
overestimate the equalising effect of the price stabilisation of 1991.
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Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. October waves. Wages deflated by the CPI. The relative
wage of a given group is obtained by dividing the real wage of that group by a weighted average of all real
wages, where the weights are the mean of the labour shares of the group over the four years considered.
Broadly, poverty has evolved similarly to inequality. Table 3.3 shows the evolution of the
headcount ratio for Greater Buenos Aires and all the urban areas covered by the EPH.
Considering other poverty indexes does not modify the main conclusions.28 Poverty increased
strongly in the eighties, particularly during the hyperinflationary peak. The macroeconomic
stabilisation implied a decrease to levels comparable to those of the previous stability period.29
From 1993 to 1996 poverty increased significantly, and then it has descended slightly. Poverty
is now situated in a level only exceeded during the hyperinflationary crises.
Table 3.3
Poverty headcount ratio
Argentina, 1980-1998
GBA All urban
areas
1980 8.0          
1985 16.0        
1988 35.4        
1989 46.8        
1990 41.0        39.4        
1991 22.7        27.1        
1992 17.6        23.3        
1993 16.8        21.7        
1994 18.5        22.8        
1995 23.7        28.4        
1996 26.0        30.7        
1997 24.7        29.0        
1998 25.6        29.9        
Source: World Bank (2000)
An economy’s performance should be evaluated in terms of both its average income and the
dispersion in the distribution. The aggregate welfare functions allow this joint evaluation. Figure
3.2 presents the evolution of various aggregate welfare indicators that capture alternative value
judgements. After deep fluctuations, the evaluation that all the considered functions make in
1994 is similar to the one of 1980. In contrast, the dispersion of opinions is magnified in the
following years. While for some functions 1998 was a better year than 1994, the evaluation is
the opposite for others. This disparity in the evaluations has no precedents in the recent
Argentine economic history and responds to the combined phenomenon of a mild economic
growth and a substantial increase in inequality in the second half of the nineties.
                                                
28 See the official statistics of the INDEC, World Bank (2000) and Llach and Montoya (1999).
29 The previous comment about the spurious effects of inflation over inequality can be applied to the case
of poverty. It is possible that both the strong increase during hyperinflation and the huge decrease of
poverty during the stabilisation shown by Table 3.3 are overstated.
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Figure 3.2
Welfare indicators
Argentina, 1980-1998
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Source: Gasparini and Sosa Escudero (2000).
4. Explaining inequality
Explaining inequality changes is not an easy task since most economic factors affect income
distribution. Take for instance the substantial increase in inequality in the nineties. There are
multiple hypotheses concerning the determinants of that increase, mainly as a result of the
temporal coincidence with the numerous economic transformations detailed in section 2.
During the last decade the economy experimented a strong trade liberalisation process,
globalisation promoted technological changes, almost all the state-owned firms were
privatised, most markets were deregulated, the pension system and the labour laws were
reformed, new macroeconomic policies helped to control inflation, unemployment grew to
unprecedented rates, the labour unions lost power, the population’s average educational level
increased substantially, the proportion of young people and women in the labour market
increased, the tax system and the size and structure of public expenditure were modified, the
political scene changed and possibly, many social norms and behaviours were altered. All
these factors, many of them surely related, could have affected income inequality in the
nineties.
Naturally, it is difficult to extract conclusive evidence in favour of any of the multiple possible
hypotheses in relatively short periods of time where so many variables change at the same
time. For this reason, this section simply tries to explicit some hypotheses and to present
preliminary empirical evidence that allows making a first assessment of their relevance for the
Argentine case.
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4.1. A characterisation of inequality changes
A first step in the study of the causes of inequality changes is to quantify the effect of various
direct determinants, through a decomposition analysis. The literature has identified various
potentially relevant factors: changes in the returns to education, to experience and
unobservable factors, changes in the wage gap between genders, changes in the occupational
choices of individuals and transformation in the age and educational structure of the population.
Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2000) present evidence about the importance of
most of these factors. Table 4.1 reproduces the results for the equivalent household labour
income distribution in Greater Buenos Aires.30
Table 4.1
Microeconometric decomposition of changes in the Gini coefficient
Equivalent household labour income distribution
Greater Buenos Aires, 1986, 1992, 1998
86-92 92-98 86-98
Observed 0.7 8.5 9.2
Effects 
1. Returns to education -0.9 2.8 1.8
2. Gender wage gap 0.1 -0.1 0.0
3. Returns to experience -0.5 0.7 0.3
4. Unobservables 0.4 1.7 2.1
5. Hours of work 1.0 1.8 3.0
6. Participation -0.1 0.1 -0.1
7. Education 0.2 0.5 0.9
8. Rest -0.3 1.5 1.1
                                Source: Gasparini, Marchionni and Sosa Escudero (2000).
The figures in the table should be read in the following way. Between 1992 and 1998 the Gini
coefficient of the distribution of equivalent household labour income increased 8.5 points. The
value 2.8 in the second column for the returns to education implies, roughly, that the change in
the Gini would have been 2.8 points if only the returns to education had changed between
1992 and 1998. Given that 2.8 is a positive and large number compared to the rest of the
column, we conclude that changes in the returns to education explain a very significant part of
the increase in income inequality in period 1992-1998. Changes in the returns to unobservable
factors and in hours of work have also a significant role.31 The former effect probably captures
an increase in the return to unobservable skills, while the latter reflects the dramatic reduction
in the hours worked by unskilled individuals.
It is interesting to notice the minor relevance of other factors. For instance, although the wage
gap between men and women has been substantially reduced, the gender effect on household
income inequality is negligible, basically due to the fact that working women are evenly
distributed along the household income distribution.
                                                
30 Gasparini (1999b), González Rozada and Menéndez (1999) and Altimir et al. (2000) study the changes in
inequality through different types of decompositions, reaching similar conclusions.
31 The effect of unobservables arises from computing the standard error of the residuals of a wage
regression. See Juhn et al. (1993) and Bourguignon et al. (1999).
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One of the most notorious economic facts in the nineties was the drastic increase in the
unemployment rate. This rate climbed from 6% at the beginning of the decade to nearly 14%
at the end of 1999, reaching a peak of 18.4% in May, 1995.32 This significant rise was in great
part accompanied by a decrease in the inactivity rate of roughly the same magnitude, implying
that the sum of unemployed and inactive individuals did not vary very much in the period.33
Consequently, in spite of the explosive increase in the unemployment rate, the proportion of
people with zero income remained relatively constant during the period, implying a small labour
participation effect over inequality (see row 6 in Table 4.1).
The following story seems to have characterised the labour market in the nineties. The
rationalisation of the public administration, the privatisation of firms, the technological changes,
and the adjustment in some sectors due to trade liberalisation implied a loss of numerous jobs.
However, at the same time the Argentine economy grew at high rates, creating employment.
An additional phenomenon shows up in the labour story of the nineties. A very significant
number of individuals, particularly women and young people, entered the labour market. This
substantial fall in the inactivity rate had an essential role in explaining the increase in
unemployment.
Which factors operated with particular force in the nineties so as to increase the returns to
formal education, experience and unobservable skills, and reduce the hours worked by the
unskilled? The following four subsections are aimed to discuss these points based on a simple
supply and demand model of the labour market, incorporating two potentially relevant
institutional factors: the labour unions and the minimum wage.
4.2. Labour supply
The two phenomena that have characterised labour supply over the last decades all over the
world - the increase in the participation of women and skilled workers - had also taken place
in Argentina. Women represented the 32.5% of the economically active population of Greater
Buenos Aires in 1980. This value grew to 40.5% in 1998. Table 4.2 shows the shares of three
educational groups in total labour and in employment. In less than two decades college
graduates increased their participation in almost 7 points in total labour and 16 points in
employment. The increase was particularly strong during the 1992-1998 period. The share of
unskilled individuals has substantially shrunk in total labour supply and employment.34 These
changes are the result of both individual decisions as a response of persistent high returns to
education and government efforts to expand education.35
                                                
32 These values correspond to all urban areas covered by the EPH.
33 This aggregate behaviour is repeated, in general, for all the educational groups.
34 The available evidence shows that neither the foreign nor the domestic migrations seemed to have
altered the labour supply in a significant way during this period in the Greater Buenos Aires. See
Arruñada, Basch and Escanes (1999).
35 In the nineties the compulsory years of education were increased from 7 to 10 and a larger system of
scholarships was implemented. The new educational system in Argentina is divided into four levels: pre-
primary school (from 3 to 5 years old - only the last one is compulsory), primary school (from 6 to 14 -
compulsory), secondary school (from 15 to 17 or 18) and college level (universities and technical colleges).
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Table 4.2
Share of total labour and employment by educational group
                      Share                Change in share
Educational group 1980 1986 1992 1998 80-86 86-92 92-98 80-98
Total labour
Without a high school degree 71.4 66.7 61.5 56.1 -4.7 -5.2 -5.4 -15.3
High School graduates 21.5 23.7 27.5 30.0 2.2 3.7 2.5 8.5
College graduates 7.1 9.6 11.0 13.9 2.4 1.5 2.9 6.8
Employment
Without a high school degree 63.0 55.2 45.8 38.2 -7.8 -9.4 -7.6 -24.8
High School graduates 25.2 29.9 32.6 34.1 4.7 2.7 1.5 8.8
College graduates 11.8 14.9 21.6 27.8 3.1 6.7 6.2 16.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. October waves.
Assuming stable labour demand, the labour supply shifts displayed in the previous table would
imply a fall in the relative wage of the more educated workers. Table 3.2 shows wage
movements between 1980 and 1992 that are consistent with this story. In contrast, between
1992 and 1998 the relative wage of the more educated significantly increased to
unprecedented levels. In a model of demand and supply equilibrium, the explanation to this
phenomenon requires dramatic changes in the relative demand of skilled workers in the
nineties, both with respect to labour supply changes in the nineties and with respect to labour
demand changes in the eighties.
4.3. Labour demand
There are several reasons that can account for the increase in the relative demand of skilled
work. The most usual ones in the literature are: (i) increases in the relative demand of skilled
labour intensive goods, (ii) the opening to the international trade with countries that are
relatively abundant in unskilled labour, (iii) technological change biased towards skilled labour,
and (iv) reduction in the price of capital, usually considered as p-complement of the skilled
labour. The first two factors work through changes in the sector composition of employment
(between-sector shifts). The remaining two imply a relative increase in the use of skilled labour
within each sector (within-sector shifts). There is evidence that both between and within sector
shifts had taken place in Argentina.
4.3.1. Between-sector shifts
Table 4.3 shows important reallocations of employment among sectors, particularly during the
last 12 years. The most significant changes are the decrease in the industry share and the
                                                                                                                                              
Public education is free of charge in all levels and there is free access, even at the college level. Private
institutions have flourished as a consequence of increasing social segregation and increasing demand for
a better education than the one offered at public schools. School attendance is close to 100% at the
primary level. Attendance rates fall at the secondary level where inequities in the access to education
show up: while 48% of youths between 15 and 17 in the poorest quintile attend secondary school, that
proportion in the richest quintile is 96%. The corresponding attendance rates in the tertiary level are 13.9
and 74.2 (Gasparini et al. (2000)).
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strong increase in the skilled labour intensive services: professional and business services,
public administration, education and welfare. It is worth noting that while publicly provided
services substantially increased their share in employment between 1986 and 1992, private
services (professional and business services, communications, transport and utilities) were the
ones that had that role during the nineties.
Table 4.3
Share of total employment by sector of activity
        Share in total employment Change in share of total employment
Sector of activity 80 86 92 98 80-86 86-92 92-98 80-98
Low tech manufacturing 10.9     10.6     9.0       5.5       -0.4 -1.5 -3.6 -5.5
Basic and high tech manufacturing 20.3     18.1     14.7     11.7     -2.2 -3.4 -3.0 -8.6
Construction 9.4       6.1       4.5       5.6       -3.3 -1.6 1.1 -3.8
Wholesale and retail trade 17.3     19.1     18.9     18.9     1.7 -0.2 0.0 1.6
Communications, transport and utilities 8.1       7.1       8.7       11.1     -1.0 1.7 2.3 2.9
Professional and business services 9.0       11.0     10.7     15.0     2.1 -0.3 4.3 6.0
Public administration, education and welfare 16.5     15.8     24.8     26.0     -0.7 9.0 1.2 9.5
Other services 8.5       12.4     8.7       6.4       3.8 -3.7 -2.4 -2.2
Total 100.0   100.0   100.0   100.0   
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. October waves.
Changes in employment are essentially the consequence of productive reallocations. Between
1991 and 1997 the aggregate value of the (unskilled labour intensive) textile sector did not
grow while the food, beverage and tobacco sector grew a 4.3% annually. In contrast, in the
same period the annual growth was 13.1% in banks and insurance, 9.4% in the recently
privatised sectors and 8.8% in professional and business services (Altimir and Beccaria,
1999).
Table 4.4 shows the shares of employment of an educational group in each sector.
Professional services, business and public services are intensive in skilled labour. On the other
hand, construction, personal services, commerce and low technology industries are more
intensive in unskilled labour.
Table 4.4
Share of employment of an educational group in a sector
      Without a hs degree      High school graduates       College graduates
Sector of activity 80 86 92 98 80 86 92 98 80 86 92 98
Low tech manufacturing 72    73    67    67    22    23    27    30    6      5      6      4      
Basic and high tech manufacturing 66    58    55    41    27    31    32    42    7      11    14    17    
Construction 80    79    71    72    13    12    23    22    7      8      6      6      
Wholesale and retail trade 72    60    50    48    26    34    41    40    2      6      10    13    
Communications, transport and utilities 79    62    55    44    17    31    33    40    4      7      12    16    
Professional and business services 18    16    15    16    44    48    46    40    38    36    38    44    
Public administration, education and welfare 37    31    23    20    34    32    30    25    29    37    47    54    
Other services 91    79    79    67    8      17    18    28    1      4      2      5      
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. October waves.
Summing up, there is evidence of sector changes that have favoured skilled labour, especially
in the 1986-1998 period. The source of the increment in the demand of college graduates has
varied over time: while the role of government was crucial in the eighties, in the nineties several
private services took that role. The fall of industry during the whole period seems to be the
main determinant of the collapse of the demand for individuals with high school degree or less.
30
Table 4.5 confirms the unequalising effect of sector changes showing the results of a
decomposition of the change in the share of each educational group in total employment. The
table presents the results of dividing this change into two effects: the change in the share of
each sector in total employment (between-effect) and the changes in the factor intensity in each
sector (within-effect).
Table 4.5
Decomposition of changes in the share of a given group in total employment
                 Between                    Within                  Overall
Educational group 80-86 86-92 92-98 80-98 80-86 86-92 92-98 80-98 80-86 86-92 92-98 80-98
Without a hs degree -0.5 -3.8 -2.7 -6.5 -7.3 -5.6 -4.9 -18.3 -7.8 -9.4 -7.6 -24.8
High school graduates 0.3 0.7 0.6 1.3 4.3 2.0 0.8 7.6 4.7 2.7 1.5 8.8
College graduates 0.2 3.1 2.1 5.3 3.0 3.6 4.1 10.7 3.1 6.7 6.2 16.0
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EPH. October waves.
Note: Between-effect for group i is the sum over all sectors of changes in sector shares in total
employment weighted by the group i share in total sector employment. Within effect is the sum over all
sectors of changes in group i share in total sector employment weighted by sector shares in total
employment. Figures in table are the averages of changing the base periods to calculate the weights.
Two interesting phenomena arise from the first four columns of table 4.5. (i) The between
effects are increasing in the educational level. In fact, they are negative for the less educated,
positive but small for high school graduates and strong for college graduates. This suggests that
changes in the productive and employment structure have clearly favoured skilled workers
during the period under analysis. (ii) The between effect is mild between 1980 and 1986 and
larger in the remaining part of the period. Surprisingly, the effect in the period of greatest
structural changes (92-98) is not larger than the effect in the previous period (86-92).
The sector changes seemed to have affected the wage gap between workers with different
skills. Which has been the role of globalisation in these changes? As it was mentioned,
Argentina experienced a short-lived integration process to the world economy at the end of
the seventies and a more deep and lasting process in the nineties. For a country abundant in
natural resources and in skilled work (Cristini, 1999),36 the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts
that the opening to international trade would bear a fall in the relative price of the unskilled
labour intensive goods, a productive and employment reallocation against these goods and a
decrease in the price of the factor used intensively in these sectors.
The evidence about trade and relative prices of section 2, as the one about employment and
wages of this section is consistent with this story. The trade liberalisation process in Argentina
contributed to the change in relative prices against the industry and in favour of services,
particularly those more intensive in skilled labour. These price changes were accompanied by
                                                
36 Argentina is certainly a country rich in natural resources. Regarding labour, although compared to the
rest of the world the result is not clear, compared to its partners in Mercosur Argentina is relatively
abundant in skilled labour.
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reallocations in production and employment and by a fall in the relative price of unskilled
labour. The scarce works on this subject for Argentina share these results. García Swartz
(1998) and Galiani and Sanguinetti (2000) show that trade flows, production, employment and
goods and factors relative prices moved in the last two decades according to what the
Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems would predict for an economy with the
relative endowment of Argentina.
The between-sector story faces an important caveat. As skilled labour relative wage increases
as a consequence of between-sector shifts one would expect a reduction in the relative use of
that factor in all sectors. However, as it is shown in the next section this has not happened in
Argentina. We now turn to within-sector shifts to examine this and other related points.
4.3.2. Within-sector shifts
The two last decades have been the scenario of an increase in the relative use of skilled labour
in almost all sectors (see table 4.4). It is interesting to note that these changes have been
relatively uniform along the period considered. The results of the decomposition shown in
Table 4.5 confirm the presumption of a negative within-effect for those individuals without a
high school degree, positive for the rest, and particularly relevant for college graduates. The
effect in the nineties has been of a greater magnitude for this group and somewhat lower for
the rest, compared to the previous decade.
Two factors related to globalisation could be behind these within-effects: factor non-neutral
technological changes and changes in the relative price of non-labour inputs.37 The periods of
trade liberalisation in Argentina had been characterised by a decrease in the price of capital
goods and by a strong increase in the imports of these goods. These factors probably harmed
unskilled labour, given that capital is generally p-complement with skilled labour and that the
incorporation of new capital bring technological advances, predominantly biased against less
educated individuals.
Which is the relative importance of the studied factors over the inequality changes? Is, for
instance, the between-sector effect, generated by trade liberalisation, important with respect to
the rest of the factors? This is a much-debated question in the literature and we do not attempt
to give a rigorous answer here.38 Instead, we try to shed some light on the Argentine case by
presenting the simple decomposition of Table 4.5. For all the years and educational groups
considered the within-effect is of greater magnitude than the between-effect, implying that
changes in the productive and employment structure of the economy might have had only a
minor effect over inequality. Galiani and Sanguinetti (2000) present evidence for Greater
Buenos Aires that shows that the relative wage of skilled workers increased more in those
sectors in which the import penetration grew more. Nevertheless, they conclude that this effect
can only account for a minor part of the increase in wage inequality. García Swartz (1998)
also concludes that within-effects had a preponderant role in the wage gap changes among
                                                
37 Naturally, changes in the factor intensity could simply be a movement along a stable demand curve.
38 See Bound and Johnson (1992) and Feenstra and Hanson (1999) among others.
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educational groups. Using a production function approach Porto (2000) finds a somewhat
higher trade effect on relative wages.
4.4. Changes in labour institutions
Labour institutions, typically labour unions and minimum wages, can damp the impact of
market forces on real and relative wages. Although the empirical evidence is scarce in
Argentina, the generalised perception is that the unions power has varied sensitively in the last
decades. The military government of 1976-1983 had outlaw labour unions and collective
bargaining. The labour unions recovered their power at the beginning of the democratic regime
and retained it during the eighties, when the prevailing wage negotiations were through
centralised collective bargaining. In the nineties the bargaining power of the labour unions
decreased sensitively, because of various phenomena. The traumatic experience of
hyperinflation and the social perception of the need of drastic measures plus a new government
allied with the unions leaders introduced a long period of contention of social protests. The
economic opening and the deregulation called for decentralised wage negotiations linking
wages to productivity. Finally, the new scenario of high unemployment limited the traditional
pressure of the labour unions for wage increases, at the expense of lower levels of
employment. This loss of power coincided with a fall in industrial employment, where unions
are traditionally stronger.
The theory and the international empirical evidence generally point out an unequalising effect of
the decreasing in the unions power.39 There are no works for Argentina that analyse deeply this
relation. At least, the timing of the phenomena does not seem to contradict this hypothesis.
Inequality rose strongly at the end of the seventies and the nineties, two periods of diminution
of the labour unions power.
The fall of the minimum wage has also been pointed out as a determinant of the increase in
wage inequality. The minimum wage, created in Argentina in 1964, was used as an indexing
mechanism and brought pressure over the relative wages along the decades. The ratio
between minimum and average wage, that was 37% in 1983, reached its lowest value in 1990
(13%) and was stabilised since 1993 around 25%. Its use as an instrument for modifying the
relative wage structure has been lost since 1989.40
4.5. Interpreting the evidence
During the 1980-1986 period the relative wages changed slightly in favour of the unskilled.
This fact seems to be the consequence of a relative rise in the skilled labour supply, plus non-
significant movements of the labour demand. This stability of the demand could be the
consequence of a closed economy with minor sector reallocations and little technological
change. This was a period of increase in labour unions power, which favoured the unskilled
workers.
                                                
39 See DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and Gustafsson y Johansson (1999).
40 See Bour and Susmel (1999).
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The two following sub-periods (1986-1992 and 1992-1998) have various characteristics in
common. The skilled labour supply continued rising, sector changes were strong and in favour
of a greater skilled labour demand and the intensity of use of educated labour substantially
increased in the majority of the sectors. In spite of these similarities, the results in terms of
relative wages were totally different. While between 1986 and 1992 the skilled wage premium
fell, between 1992 and 1998 it strongly increased. What differences explain this different wage
behaviour? Since there are no systematic studies on the subject, we present some conjectures.
1. Although the between-effect of Table 4.5 is of similar magnitude in both periods, the nature
of the sector shifts is very different. The increase in skilled labour demand between 1986 and
1992 was leaded by public sector employment and between 1992 and 1998 by the
professional and business service sector. It is likely that workers of high education in both
sectors present different characteristics and that wage practices in both sectors differ. In fact,
the average wage of a college graduate in the public sector was only 62% of its wage in the
private professional sector in 1998. Given these differences, it is possible that an expansion in
public sector employment does not impact in the same way than an expansion in the
professional and business sector over the wages of college graduates taken as a whole. In fact,
between 1986 and 1992 the expansion of employment in the public sector was accompanied
by a very slight increase in the relative wage of college graduates in that sector while the
relative wage of the professionals in the private sector decreased slightly. In contrast, between
1992 and 1998, the expansion of private services was followed by a notable increase in the
wages of the college graduates in that sector, and a very small increase in the wages of the
college graduates working in the public sector.
2. The empirical evidence of section 2 suggests that the technological change was small
between 1986-1992 and that it accelerated significantly in the nineties, due to trade
liberalisation, deregulations and foreign direct investment. Additionally, the capital goods price
also fell in the nineties. Although the within-effects of Table 4.5 are similar in both periods,
their sources seem to have been different. Between 1986 and 1992 the skilled labour supply
prevailed over a minor demand effect, which implied a decrease in the skilled relative wage
and in turn a natural increase in this factor intensity of use in all sectors. In period 1992-1998,
the biased technological change and the fall in the price of capital, in addition to sector
changes, generated a strong increase in the demand for skilled workers, that surpassed the
supply shift and made the college graduates relative wage rise. Skilled-labor intensity of use
increased in most of the sectors in spite of the rise in its relative price, due to the technological
change.
3. The institutional factors contributed to the differences between both periods. In particular,
the decrease of the labour unions power has possibly contributed to limit the wage of the
unskilled in the nineties, compared to the previous decade.
4.6. Other income sources
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The available evidence shows that the share of capital in total disposable income has increased
in Argentina in the nineties, as it is expected in a framework of privatisation, deregulation and
investment growth. The statistics from EPH show an increase in the share of capital along the
decade. Other rough estimations based on Meloni (1999) indicate that capital income
increased 32.9% and labour income 19.1%. An increase in the share of capital in total income
tend to rise household income inequality, due to a greater concentration of that income source
in the richer segments of the population.
It is also highly probable that the entrepreneurial gains also grew in the nineties, in part as a
product of a drastic withdrawal of the public sector from the economy. Nevertheless, because
of diverse deficiencies, neither the EPH nor the National Accounts help us to evaluate properly
this hypothesis. There is no information about the evolution of the return to natural resources
either. Being Argentina a country rich in natural resources, the trade liberalisation implies an
increase in the relative price, exports and production of goods that are intensive in this factor.
There is evidence on the movement of exports and production in the expected way, and there
is coincidence among analysts on a substantial increase in the return to land and other natural
resources, but, once again, there is no firm empirical evidence on this point.
Pensions constitute the third income source by order of importance, after labour and capital. In
the nineties the share of this income source grew, implying an equalising effect over global
inequality given that the average (and median) pension payment is lower than mean income.
On the other hand, the pension system reforms of the nineties implied a very significant
increase in inequality within pension recipients.41
Summing up, although the analysis of other income sources lacks of the empirical evidence
available for labour income, it is possible to conjecture that the changes of the nineties were
mostly unequalising. The increase in the share of capital, entrepreneurial benefits and natural
resources and the increase in the dispersion in pensions contributed to rise the income
inequality level in Argentina.
4.7. From the individual to the family
The available estimations show that the relative size of the poorer families has increased with
respect to the richer families. Gasparini (1999b) reports that the number of equivalent adults of
an average family in the first decile exceeded in 0.88 the value corresponding to a typical
family of the tenth decile in 1992. That difference was widened to 1.38 in 1997. These
changes would have a non-trivial effect over household income inequality among individuals.
4.8. From nominal to real income
Income comparisons among individuals and over time should be made in real terms. Ideally, a
household income should be divided by the price index of the specific bundle consumed.
However, the usual practice in Argentina is to divide incomes by the average CPI of the month
                                                
41 See Gasparini (1999b).
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in which incomes are reported. This practice introduces two problems. The first one, already
mentioned, implies the overestimation of the income variability in periods of high inflation. The
second one implies biasing the results if changes in prices differ among goods and services and
if the consumption bundles differ among income groups.
The deregulations of many markets, the privatisations, the trade opening and the exchange rate
appreciation have generated important relative price changes in Argentina. In particular, the
price of tradable goods decreased in relation to the price of non-tradable goods. Between
1988 and 1998 the prices of non-durable consumption goods fell 25%, clothing 50%, and
durable consumption goods 15%, while the prices of housing, education and health increased
(26%, 153% and 53%, respectively). In spite of being essentially non-tradable, the price of
public utilities decreased 20% after the privatisations.42 Given that poor people consume a
larger fraction of their budget in tradable consumption goods, an equalising effect from price
changes is expected. Navajas (1999) points out that this positive impact was relevant between
1988 and 1994, when the economy was stabilised, the external trade liberalised, and the
privatisations were carried out. In contrast, since the middle of the nineties, the evolution of the
prices have played an unequalising role, in part because of the strong increase in prices of
privatised public utilities. Considering the whole decade, Gasparini (1999a) finds that the
differential evolution of consumer prices has implied only a mild equalising effect on household
income inequality.
4.9. Public policies
The available estimations suggest that the fiscal policy has become more pro-poor in the
nineties.43 The social public expenditure benefits concentration index (excluding social security
payments) was -0.140 in 1991 and -0.145 in 1997, indicating a greater concentration of
social expenditures on poor households (Gasparini, 1999c). The tax system concentration
index increased from 0.351 to 0.355 in the same period, implying a larger burden on richer
households. These changes, that in principle would reveal a more active public sector role in
counteracting the effects of the inequality rise during the decade, have three important
qualifications.
1. Mostly, the progressivity increase has not been the consequence of a deliberate
governmental action for decreasing inequality. The tax reforms - essentially the increase of
the income tax share and the replacement of the inflationary tax by legislated taxes - had a
pro-poor bias, but they arise from the need of increasing the economic efficiency and
consolidating stability. Also, the main reason behind a greater targeting in public
expenditures is a strong movement of richer families towards attending private schools and
hospitals, possibly as a consequence of the deterioration in the quality of public services.
2. The increase in the pro-poor bias of the fiscal policy has been much smaller in comparison
to the increase in pre-fiscal inequality. Gasparini (1999c) presents estimations of the
                                                
42 Navajas (1999).
43 See Gasparini (1999c), Llach and Montoya (1999) and DNPGS (1999).
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redistributive impact of taxes and expenditure in the period 1986-1997 and concludes that
the trend in the pre-fiscal Gini coefficient does not significantly differ from the trend in the
post-fiscal Gini. Considering the fiscal policy does not alter the pattern of evolution of
inequality pointed out in Table 3.1.
3. Public spending in specific programs designed to fight poverty has not accompanied the
evolution of the poverty indicators. The signs of the annual changes in poverty and the
expenditure in social aid are frequently the opposite. It is particularly worrying the dynamic
in periods of economic crises (1980/82, 1987/90 and 1995) when poverty rises, and the
budget of poverty-reduction programs decreases, presumably due to fiscal reasons.
World Bank (2000) reports public expenditure elasticities with respect to GDP. The one
corresponding to the targeted social expenditures is 1.87, showing a strong pro-cyclical
behaviour, even greater than in other areas of the public sector.
Summing up, government policies did not respond quickly to the increase in poverty and
inequality. The social safety net was not significantly modified during the decade in which
inequality grew to unprecedented levels. In contrast, the government had a faster reaction
concerning the increase of unemployment. This asymmetry responds to the perception by the
government and by a great part of society that unemployment is the most urging economic
problem, and that the increase of poverty and inequality are direct consequences of it. In a few
years the government has implemented an unemployment insurance, created various public
employment programs, subsidised private employment and organised labour training
programs. Given that these policies have only a few years of life, it is still premature to evaluate
their consequences. Nevertheless, most analysts remain sceptical about the potential of these
programs to generate new productive jobs.
5. A final assessment and policy lessons
Inequality in Argentina has grown since mid-seventies. The second halves of every decade
were periods of particular increase of income dispersion. The strong but transitory opening to
foreign trade and the repression to labour unions by the military dictatorship seem to have
contributed to inequality increase in the second half of the seventies. The scarce information
about household surveys in that period makes it difficult to elaborate a deeper analysis. The
increase of inequalities in the last part of the eighties seems to be related to macroeconomic
instability and the hyperinflationary crises. When the crises were overcame, at the beginning of
the nineties, inequality and poverty levels returned to the levels of the previous macroeconomic
stability period.
Inequality grew strongly between 1992 and 1998. Several factors contribute to explain this
increase. One of the most important factors is the dramatic increase in the relative wage of
skilled workers. This increase took place in spite of a large rise in the relative supply of college
graduates, suggesting a remarkable role for demand shifts. Sector reallocations, in great part
due to trade liberalisation, explain a significant, although smaller, part of the wage gap
widening. The increase in the intensity of use of skilled labour in all the productive sectors
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seems to be a more important factor. It was probably induced by a fall in the price of capital
and the introduction of new skilled labour intensive technologies, both likely consequences of
the greater integration of Argentina to the world markets. The decrease of labour unions
power in a framework of deindustrialization, growing unemployment, alliances of the labour
unions leaders with the government and a social environment more permeable to accept wage
differentials probably contributed to the increase in inequality.
Unemployment, sub-occupation, and informality are phenomena that exacerbated in the
nineties and contributed to inequality growth. The increasing foreign competition, the stronger
tax pressure, and the recurrent macroeconomic crises generated the need of adjusting the
nominal wages downwards. Some analysts sustain that informality, sub-employment and
unemployment result from the combination of these factor with static prices (and even deflation
in some years) and sticky nominal wages.
Several additional factors can be added to the list of unequalising effects in the nineties: the
increase of the relative size of the poorest families, the increase of the capital income share,
presumably the increase of the entrepreneurial benefits and the return to natural resources, and
the increase in the dispersion of pensions payments.
The fiscal policy had a passive role. The specific programs against poverty did not significantly
changed in the period under analysis. However, the government has made visible efforts to
fight unemployment, without clear favourable results.
Summing up, inequality has increased in Argentina in the last decades, particularly in the
nineties. The increasing integration to the global economy possibly played an important role in
the inequality increase. The opening to the goods, service and factor markets has implied
productive reallocations and absorption of technological changes that harmed the relative
position of poor unskilled individuals. However, these policies possibly contributed in a
significant way to getting out of the stagnation in which the Argentine economy was stuck.
The policy lessons that arise from this analysis are not obvious. Opposing to integration and
new technology incorporation does not seem to be a reasonable option, because economic
growth is related to the capability of inserting the country in the global economy and of
increasing the productivity through the absorption of new technologies. In this sense, the
increase of inequality seems to be an inevitable phenomenon.
Given that one of the main reasons of the increase in skilled labour demand - globalisation -
does not seem to be modifiable, the remaining options should be aimed at increasing the
supply of that factor and mitigating the effects of the increase in income disparities. In both
alternatives the role of the public sector could be very important.
The increase in the supply of skilled labour can be promoted by the government through
education and labour training policies. However, the nature of these policies is not obvious.
For example, an increase in public expenditure in education does not necessarily lead to an
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increase in educational quality. Also, labour training public programs had been repeatedly put
in doubt. Additionally, educational programs take some time in generating results, they can
have a unequalising effect if their scope is limited to small groups, and demand a large amount
of resources for having sizeable effects on inequality. In spite of these problems governments
have had some success in promoting the educational upgrading of the population. However,
more efforts are needed in keeping youths from low-income households at the secondary
school and helping them to attend college. Although public universities are free of charge,
individuals from poor families do not have the means to pay the opportunity costs of attending
school. Given that they do not have access to capital markets either, they are excluded from
higher education levels, even when they are aware of the skill premium. Finding ways of
effectively promoting education is surely one of the big challenges of public policy.
The only alternatives to generate positive results in the short run are the increase in the
redistributive character of fiscal policy and the extension of the social safety net. There is some
margin in the Argentine case for advancing in both directions. The tax system in Argentina is
similar to other Latin-American countries, but more regressive than the OECD countries. A
tax reform that increases the share of income taxes at the expense of labour and consumption
taxes would have positive redistributive effects. In addition, a policy aimed at reducing tax
evasion would alleviate horizontal as well as vertical inequities, generating resources that would
allow the increase of social expenditures or the reduction of regressive taxes.44
There is some margin to improve the focalisation of public expenditures, although most part of
the gains would probably come from the improvement of the public programs administrative
management. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable to increase the budget of these programs to
cover reasonably all the poor population.45 Additionally, social aid should be counter-cyclical,
growing in the periods of crises and increase of social exclusion. Despite these apparent needs
and the current political and social will of satiating them, the possibilities of significantly
improving the safety net in periods of fiscal constraints as the ones Argentina is going through
are uncertain.
Finally, some comments over other public economic policies. Policies that tend to a less
restricted functioning of the labour market would possibly generate decreases in the
unemployment and informality rates, although their final effect over inequality is not clear, as
they probably imply a reduction in the wage of unskilled workers. Sound macroeconomic
policies do not warrant a reduction of inequality, but they prevent hyperinflationary crises and
recessions that greatly impact over the poor population. Policies aimed at attracting foreign
productive investments do not assure a more equitable economy, either, but they promote
growth, that eventually move the economy to a Pareto-superior situation.
                                                
44 Di Gresia (2000) estimates that the evasion of the income tax is 50%. The evasion rate would be 30% for
the value added tax (Libonatti, 2000).
45 See Harriague and Gasparini (1999).
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Table 2.1
Macroeconomic indicators for Argentina, 1970-1999
Averages
1970-1975 3.3 62.3 54.3 5.1 333.3 12.4 -7.6 2,723
1976-1982 0.1 189.3 75.3 3.8 130.2 6.6 -10.6 4,155
1983-1990 -0.4 1,064.9 118.9 6.0 151.4 5.7 -5.0 3,510
1991-1999 5.2 12.6 46.1 12.4 101.1 7.4 -0.7 8,034
Year Growth Annual Real Urban Real M1 Fiscal Per
rate of rate of Exchange Unemployment Wage Surplus Capita
GDP Inflation Rate Annual Industry GDP
CPI Average
% % 1980=100 % 1990=100 % of GDP % of GDP US$
1970 5.4 13.6 56.7 5.0 329.9 14.8 -2.0 1,238
1971 3.7 34.6 49.7 5.9 334.9 12.8 -4.6 1,474
1972 1.8 58.5 52.9 6.6 309.7 9.9 -6.1 2,191
1973 3.5 60.3 58.6 5.5 339.0 11.3 -8.6 3,592
1974 5.7 24.2 71.2 4.2 355.6 15.1 -8.5 4,710
1975 -0.4 182.8 36.9 3.6 330.8 10.5 -15.6 3,133
1976 -0.5 444.0 46.4 4.8 200.2 7.1 -10.6 1,445
1977 6.4 176.0 50.7 3.3 150.7 6.7 -5.0 2,422
1978 -3.4 175.5 64.7 3.2 96.8 6.7 -6.7 3,195
1979 6.7 159.5 83.4 2.5 93.9 6.5 -6.7 5,248
1980 0.7 100.8 100.0 2.5 112.6 7.9 -8.6 7,410
1981 -4.6 104.5 89.0 4.8 126.8 6.2 -18.0 5,923
1982 -4.5 164.8 93.0 5.3 130.5 5.0 -18.9 3,440
1983 3.3 343.8 92.0 4.7 197.6 4.1 -9.6 3,537
1984 1.8 626.7 137.0 4.5 203.6 3.8 -7.0 3,924
1985 -6.7 672.2 145.0 6.1 157.8 4.1 -4.0 2,918
1986 7.1 90.1 145.0 5.5 155.4 5.8 -3.1 3,440
1987 3 131.3 118.0 5.8 147.4 6.7 -5.0 3,479
1988 -2.1 387.7 125.0 6.3 132.9 5.9 -6.0 4,001
1989 -6.9 4923.6 122.0 7.6 116.4 10.4 -3.8 2,533
1990 -2.3 1343.9 67.0 7.4 100.0 4.7 -1.5 4,251
1991 11.8 84.0 48.9 6.4 101.4 4.9 -0.5 5,687
1992 11 17.3 42.9 7.0 102.7 5.8 0.6 6,830
1993 6.4 7.4 40.2 9.6 101.3 7.3 1.2 7,507
1994 5.8 3.8 42.9 11.5 102.0 7.4 -0.1 8,165
1995 -2.8 1.6 47.6 17.4 100.9 7.0 -0.5 8,110
1996 5.5 0.1 48.9 17.2 100.6 8.0 -1.9 8,527
1997 8.1 0.3 47.6 14.9 100.0 8.6 -1.5 9,171
1998 3.9 0.7 48.0 12.9 100.2 8.6 -1.4 9,355
1999 -3.1 -1.5 48.0 14.3 100.4 9.0 -2.3 8,953
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Table 2.1 (cont.)
Macroeconomic Indicators for Argentina, 1970-1999
Averages
1970-1975 22.4 22.6 -0.7 19.3 0.3 9.7 9.4
1976-1982 24.0 23.7 0.3 33.9 1.0 9.1 8.1
1983-1990 17.1 15.8 -1.3 55.8 2.8 6.6 3.8
1991-1999 19.1 15.9 -3.2 36.9 -1.5 8.9 10.4
 Source: FIEL, Dornbusch and de Pablo (1988), CEPAL (1997), Manzetti (1991), America Financiera
(various volumes) and Carta Económica.
Year Gross Domestic Current External Trade Exports Imports
Domestic Fixed Savings Account Debt balance of goods of goods
Investment
% of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP % of GDP
1970 22.8 22.7 -0.8 16.7 0.4 8.9 8.5
1971 23.8 23.8 -1.8 18.2 -0.6 8.1 8.6
1972 23.7 24.2 -1.0 21.8 0.2 8.7 8.5
1973 21.5 23.4 2.7 20.0 3.9 12.2 8.4
1974 21.4 21.8 0.4 20.4 0.9 12.4 11.4
1975 21.4 19.5 -3.5 18.6 -2.7 8.1 10.8
1976 23.6 24.7 1.7 18.6 0.0 12.5 12.5
1977 27.1 28.9 3.0 19.2 4.8 14.3 9.5
1978 24.4 25.6 4.0 23.9 3.8 11.5 7.7
1979 24.7 23.7 -1.0 30.2 0.7 9.1 8.4
1980 25.7 23.4 -2.3 37.3 -2.3 4.9 7.2
1981 23.0 20.3 -2.8 48.1 -1.5 5.4 6.9
1982 19.8 19.5 -0.3 60.3 1.7 5.9 4.2
1983 19.1 16.8 -2.3 59.5 2.1 5.8 3.8
1984 17.7 14.6 -3.2 60.5 1.7 5.6 3.9
1985 16.3 16.2 -0.1 64.3 3.3 6.9 3.6
1986 17.2 14.6 -2.6 n.a. 1.8 5.8 4.0
1987 18.8 15.0 -3.8 n.a. 1.1 5.4 4.3
1988 18.6 17.3 -1.2 n.a. 2.6 6.6 4.0
1989 15.5 15.4 -0.2 n.a. 4.0 7.6 3.6
1990 13.2 16.4 3.2 38.7 5.6 9.2 3.6
1991 15.2 14.9 -0.3 29.9 2.1 7.9 5.8
1992 17.7 15.3 -2.4 25.9 -1.6 7.1 8.6
1993 19.1 15.7 -3.4 29.8 -2.4 7.0 9.3
1994 20.5 16.1 -4.4 31.2 -3.1 7.6 10.7
1995 18.3 16.3 -2.0 36.4 -0.3 9.5 9.9
1996 18.9 16.4 -2.5 38.6 -1.2 9.7 11.0
1997 20.6 16.3 -4.3 42.1 -2.8 10.1 12.9
1998 21.1 16.0 -5.1 46.7 -2.7 10.7 13.4
1999 20.2 16.0 -4.1 51.7 -1.4 10.9 12.3
